The Clash of Corridors (with Maps)
The IMEC comes across as reactionary and inauthentic. It is the US response to Saudi, UAE, and Egypt joining BRICS as it attempts to undercut China and Russia in the region using India.
Yesterday, it became clearer why Chinese President Xi Jinping opted not to attend the G20 meeting. It would have been embarrassing for him to sit down while the US uses G20 as a platform to announce a competitive project to BRI. China is sure not happy about the announcement but is not necessarily threatened by it either. Putting China’s business aside, what is this regional frenzy around corridors all about?
The India - Middle East - Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), sponsored by the US, aims to increase energy, data, and goods mobility between the participating nations which include India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and the EU. Particularly, The IMEC will be comprised of two separate corridors, the east corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf and the northern corridor connecting the Arabian Gulf to Europe. The corridors intend to link Asia and Europe to commercial hubs to facilitate the development and export of clean energy; lay undersea cables and link energy grids and telecommunication lines to expand reliable access to electricity; enable innovation of advanced clean energy technology; and connect countries to secure and stable Internet. On paper, the project looks amazing, but is it?
First, although the corridor announcement is new, many of the projects behind it have been thrown around for years but did not gather momentum due to concerns about economic viability. The EastMed pipeline is a good example. Originally conceived in 2013, the project was a planned offshore/onshore natural gas pipeline directly connecting Israel Mediterranean energy resources to mainland Greece via Cyprus. Despite being in the making for a decade, the project never materialised. In April 2022, the US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said the pipeline would take too long to build and be too costly to be viable. Similar regional efforts yielded similar outcomes. Egypt’s new Suez Canal launched in 2015, which was expected to double the revenues of the Canal, never did. This is because global trade volume through it did not meet forecasts. The situation is so dire, the government discussed privatising it recently and it is in the process of doing so.
Second, it is almost impossible to secure the corridors, casting more doubts about their viability. Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon can easily use drones and missiles to disrupt the operations of the proposed cables and railways. This is evident by the events of the war in Ukraine. Ukrainians have targeted pipelines and railways built by Russia costing it billions in current and future economic losses. Despite the Saudi Iranian rapprochement, the region is still in turmoil and without collective security it is unclear how such corridors can be reliably protected. With Israel and Iran allies gearing up for a regional war, regional insecurity and instability will hinder the viability and sustainability of the project.
Third, the Israeli elephant in the room. The northern corridor is dependent on Saudi-Israel normalisation which is unexpected to materialise anytime soon. I have discussed the reasons for that in a previous post which can be found here. That said, Saudi is accumulating greater leverage over Israel by championing the project and the ball is in Israel’s court now whether it wants to commit to resolving the Palestinian issue and establishing formal ties with Saudi Arabia or not.
Fourth, Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria stand to be the losers of the northern corridor. Iran, Iraq, Oman and Yemen will be the losers of the east corridor. Hence, the corridors will increase geopolitical and economic grievances in the region rather than stabilise it.
Fifth, technicalities. This is just an MoU. It is not a legally biding agreement and does not have an actual work plan. Signatories are expected to meet in 60 days to discuss the specifics and maybe announce some action plan. Hence, the corridors construction will be a lengthy process. At this point, the MoU is merely a political declaration rather than a proactive action plan with clear commitments and implications. Additionally, neither Jordan nor Israel are signatories to the MoU and this will be major hurdle in front of the project. Furthermore, as this is just an MoU, it is not clear who is footing the bill for the ambitious corridors.
Lastly and most importantly, the corridors are not the only ones in town and they are competing with several other similar projects. Those include the China-led global Belt and Road Initiative, The International North-South Corridor (linking India, Russia, Iran, and gulf countries), and the recently announced Iraq Development Road (linking Asia and Europe via Iraq and Turkey). Such competition puts the viability of the IMEC further into question.
In conclusion, the IMEC comes across as reactionary and inauthentic. It is the US response to Saudi, UAE, and Egypt joining BRICS as it attempts to undercut China and Russia advances in the Middle East using India. Despite the media hype, the proposed corridors face serious challenges and their viability and sustainability are questionable. In two months, it will become clearer whether the project stands grounds or not and a more informed assessment can be made on its prospects.